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In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to
buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist’s ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage.
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1. Introduction
When the life of a durable good depends on the maintenance effort of the consumer, the contract
offered by its supplier can affect the consumer’s behavior. If the good is rented, its life will be shortened,
because the consumer cares only about the short-run effects of her maintenance decisions. If the good is
sold, its durability is enhanced, because the consumer then internalizes the long-run returns to her effort.
In the presence of moral hazard, a monopolistic supplier can discriminate amongst different consumer
types by offering a lease with an option to buy. Those consumers with a higher cost of effort will rent a
new unit every period, while the remaining ones exert effort and exercise the option to buy. The
monopolist can use the option price as a means to capture part of the consumers’ surplus from exerting
effort, but it does so at the expense of creating inefficient scrappage.T Corresp
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The effect of maintenance decisions on a durable-goods monopolist problem has been studied in the
literature. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999b) and Morita and Waldman (2004) show that a monopolist can
increase its profit by either restricting maintenance or controlling this market directly. Achter (2000)
finds that a lease can implement the first best when consumer’s effort in maintenance is not observable
and consumers are sufficiently heterogenous in their willingness to pay.1
Schmalensee (1974) shows that a rental contract is preferable to an outright purchase when
maintenance by the monopolist is technically feasible. The logic is straightforward. If the good is sold,
the monopoly price of the good will exceed the marginal cost of production. As a result consumers will
overinvest in maintenance as compared to its efficient level. Instead, the monopolist can increase its
profits by renting the good and directly performing the efficient level of maintenance. In our paper,
maintenance is always controlled by the consumer. However, the monopolist can influence the level of
maintenance by adjusting the price of the option to buy. If the price differential between leasing a new
good and exercising the option to buy equals the marginal cost of producing the new good, maintenance
will be efficient. But given the efficient price differential, the monopolist will garner the same profit from
those consumers who exercise the option to buy as from those who do not. Consumers who exert
maintenance effort and then exercise the option to buy will retain all of the surplus from their
maintenance decisions. If consumers are heterogeneous, however, the monopolist will be able to capture
part of this surplus by increasing the option price. In that event, consumers may fail to exercise their
option to buy even when it would be efficient to do so, and premature scrappage may result as a
consequence.
Finally, Bulow (1982) shows that renting emerges as the optimal contract when the monopolist cannot
commit to future prices since it resolves the time consistency problem of the firm. In our model, a lease
(in which some consumers exercise the option to buy) is optimal even if the firm cannot commit to future
prices. The intuition is that when the monopolist raises the option price to price discriminate consumers,
it also makes the contract time-consistent, because it obtains a higher profit from those consumers
exercising the option to buy than from those who lease another new good.2. Model
A full-commitment monopolist produces a semi-durable good and chooses the optimal contract to
offer to consumers. The good depreciates at a rate that depends on the consumer’s effort to maintain it.
Consumers differ in their disutility from exerting effort, which, together with the outcome of their effort,
is private information. Therefore, the contract that the monopolist offers can only specify payments that
depend on the time period and whether the good is new or used, which then falls in the general class of
leasing contracts.
The time horizon is two periods. A lease is a pair (pt, qt), where pt is the rental price and qt is
the price paid for exercising the option to buy in t +1. With two periods, the contracts are (p1, q)
and (p2). Note that if q=l, the contract is a simple rental contract since the used good is always1
Leasing also arises as the optimal contract in other environments. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999a), Hendel and Lizzeri (2002),
and Johnson and Waldman (2003) provide explanations based on adverse selection. Waldman (1999) explores the role of moral
hazard with perfect competition and adverse selection. Desai and Purohit (1998) show that when leased and sold goods have
different exogenous depreciations, a monopolist can price discriminate better by offering both contracts.
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returned to the monopolist. If q=0, the contract is a sales contract since exercising the option to buy
is free.2
Consumers differ in their cost of exerting maintenance effort, which we parameterize by h. In t =1,
each consumer-type h decides whether or not to lease a new good and the level of effort she exerts in
maintaining it. By exerting effort ea [0,1], the consumer yields a used good in t=2 that has flow of
services of ae, where aa (0,1).
The utility function for a consumer at time t is given by sptw(e,h), where s is the flow of services
for the good consumed in t, pt is its price, and w(e,h) is the utility cost for type h of exerting effort e. We
assume w(0,h)=0, w1N0, w2N0, and w12N0. In other words, zero effort is costless, utility cost is
increasing in effort and type, and there is complementarity between e and h, so that consumers with
lower h incur a lower marginal cost from exerting effort. Then, a type-h consumer derives utility of
max{1p1w(e,h), 0} in t =1 and max{1p2, aeq, 0} in t=2.3
We assume ha [0,1] is distributed according to F(h) with density function f(h), and we normalize the
mass of consumers to 1. We let cb1 denote the marginal cost of production and da [0,1] denote the
discount factor.
Given (p1,q) and (p2), type h leases a new good in t=1 if
1 p1 þmax  w e4 hð Þ; h
 þ d ae4 hð Þ  q ; d 1 p2ð Þ; 0 z0; ð1Þ
and exerts effort if
 w e4 hð Þ; h þ d ae4 hð Þ  q zmax d 1 p2ð Þ; 0f g; ð2Þ
where
e4 hð Þ ¼ argmaxe1 p1  w e; hð Þ þ d ae qð Þ: ð3Þ
Our assumptions on w imply that e*(h) is decreasing in h (higher types exert less effort) and is
independent of prices. The latter implies that when effort is exerted, the level of effort will be
independent of market structure.
Let hˆ= hˆ(p2,q) be the threshold level of h that makes Eq. (2) an equality, so that
 w e4 hˆ
 
; hˆ
 
þ d ae4 hˆ
 
 q
 
¼ max d 1 p2ð Þ; 0f g: ð4Þ
Then, a type-hˆ consumer will be indifferent between exerting effort and not. As a result, the demand
function for new goods in each period is given by
D1 p1; p2; qð Þ ¼
1 if p1V1;
F hˆ p2; qð Þ
 
otherwise;
(
ð5Þ2
Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) also make this distinction.
3 The assumption that consumers are identical in the utility they derive from consumption makes the secondary market
inactive by eliminating any gains from trade.
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and,
D2 p2; qð Þ ¼ 1 F hˆ p2; qð Þ
 
if p2V1;
0 otherwise;
(
ð6Þ
respectively, while second period scrappage equals 1F(hˆ(p2,q)).
We also require that at least for the consumers with the lowest cost of effort, maintenance is socially
optimal,
d 1 cð ÞVdae4 0ð Þ  w e4 0ð Þ; 0 : ð7Þ
2.1. First best
In a full-information, competitive equilibrium, p1=c, q=0, and p2=c. Since p1b1, all consumers buy
a new good in t=1 and types hV hˆc maintain it, where hˆc solves
 w e4 hˆc
 
; hˆc
 
þ d ae4 hˆc
 
 0
 
¼ d 1 cð Þ: ð8Þ
By Eq. (7), not all used goods are scrapped. Note that a comparison of Eqs. (4) and (8) implies that
hˆ( p2,q) equals the socially efficient hˆc if and only if p2 q = c, and exceeds it if and only if p2 q N c. If, 
for example, the monopolist chose q = 0 (a sales contract) and p2 N c, too many consumers would exert 
effort because the replacement cost in t = 2 would exceed the marginal cost of production, which would
make scrappage lower than its socially efficient level. This result is similar to the one found in
Schmalensee (1974) that shows that a monopolist earns more profit by renting the good, and performing
efficient maintenance himself, than by selling it. Although in our model, maintenance must be performed
by the user, the monopolist can modify maintenance decisions by use of the option price: for example,
by setting p2 = 1 and q =1c (which implies p2 q = c), the choice of maintenance by consumers is
socially efficient. We next show that although efficient maintenance is feasible for the monopolist, it is
not profit-maximizing.
2.2. Monopolist
We first solve for the monopolist’s optimal contract with full commitment.
Given Eqs. (4)–(6), the monopolist’s problem is given by
max
p1;q;p2
D1 p1; q; p2ð Þ p1  cð Þ þ d F hˆ p2; qð Þ
 
qþ D2 p2; qð Þ p2  cð Þ
h i
: ð9Þ
Proposition 1. For the full-commitment monopolist, the optimal contract is p1=1, q=ae*(hˆm)1/
dw(e*(hˆm), hˆm), and p2=1, where hˆm solves
d ae4 hˆm
 
 1
d
w e4 hˆm
 
; hˆm
 
 1 cð Þ

 
f hˆm
 
 w2 e4 hˆm
 
; hˆm
 
F hˆm
 
¼ 0: ð10Þ4
Proof. We only need to consider p1=1 and p1N1 in Eq. (5). (If p1b1, sales are the same as with p1=1.)
Take as given p2=1 (which follows from the consumers’ willingness to pay for a new good being 1 in
t=2) and q. These define a unique critical type in Eq. (4). If p1=1, the discounted profit equals
(1 + dqc )F (hˆ) + (1 + d)(1c )(1F (hˆ)). Instead, if p1 N1, the discounted profit equals
(1+dqc)F(hˆ)+d(1c)(1F(hˆ)). Comparing these two expressions, p1=1 is optimal. Then,
substituting p1=1 in the demand equation (Eq. (5)) and using Eq. (4) to solve for q, we can rewrite
the monopolist’s problem as
max
hˆm
1 w e4 hˆm
 
; hˆm
 
þ dae4 hˆm
 
 c
h i
F hˆm
 
þ 1 cð Þ 1þ dð Þ 1 F hˆm
  
: ð11Þ
Then, the first order condition and the envelope theorem yields Eq. (10). 5
Eq. (10) implies that the optimal option price is
q ¼ 1 cþ
w2 e
4 hˆm
 
; hˆm
 
F hˆm
 
df hˆm
  N1 c; ð12Þ
where w2N0 establishes the inequality. This result implies that p2q=1qbc and hˆc exceeds hˆm,
creating more scrappage than it is socially optimal.
Corollary 1. The optimal contract in Proposition 1 creates inefficient scrappage.
The intuition is that when q=1c (which implies p2c=q), types hb hˆc keep all the surplus from
their maintenance effort since the monopolists profit per unit sold simply equals the profit from renting
the good. To capture part of this surplus, the monopolist raises the option price, but it does so at the
expense of creating inefficient scrappage.
Proposition 2. The optimal contract in Proposition 1 is time consistent.
Since qN1c, the option price is more profitable than the highest price the monopolist can charge in
t=2 (p2=1), and the monopolist never revises its choice for p2. Corollary 1 also applies.
Remark 1. With full commitment, the monopolist can offer two contracts in t=1, A and B, such that
p1
A=1, q1
A=l, p1
BN1, and qB1 ¼
1pB
1
we hˆmð Þ;hˆmÞþdae hˆmð Þ
d . Contract A rents the good, while B sells it at a
price of p1
B+dq1
B. This sale price plays the same role as 1+dq did in Proposition 1 and thus the
monopolist accrues identical profits. For a small fixed cost of offering a contract, the two contracts
defined here are dominated by the single contract in Proposition 1.4
Remark 2. Without moral hazard (i.e., if the quality of a used good was observable), the monopolist
could condition the option price on the observed quality and improve its profit beyond Proposition 1 by
offering a family of contracts.4 This remark does not apply to the non-commitment problem: with a lower option price, the monopolist might prefer revising
p2.
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